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Abstract
TCP SYN Cookies were implemented to mitigate against DoS attacks. It ensured that the server did not have to
store any information for half-open connections. A SYN cookie contains all information required by the server to
know the request is valid. However, the usage of these cookies introduces a vulnerability that allows an attacker to
guess the initial sequence number and use that to spoof a connection or plant false logs.
1 Introduction
The idea behind SYN cookies was to process an ACK
packet without the need to store any information[1]. Ev-
erything required to validate an ACK packet is encoded
within the Initial Sequence Number generated by the
server. This is what we call a SYN Cookie. It contains
the following :
1. A timer value that increments every 64 seconds (5
bits)
2. An encoding of an MSS selected by the server in
response to the client’s MSS (3 bits)
3. A secret function, selected by the server, of the
Client IP, client port , server IP, server port and
timer value. (24 bits)
2 Literature Survey
The TCP protocol was made to a be a reliable trans-
port layer protocol. It required that unacknowledged data
packets be re-transmitted. This is where the issue arises
when using cookies. In normal mode, when the server
sends SYN-ACK but does not receive the corresponding
ACK it would re-transmit.
Eventually it would send a reset (RST) to the client to
shut it down. However if cookies are in use, the server
would not know that the returning ACK packet is lost and
retransmission would thus not be possible.
In a study by Lemon (2002), he explains the problems
with using TCP syn-cookies. He observed that a TCP
connection established in cookie mode depends entirely
on the final ACK packet.
The final ACK is completely independent of the initial
SYN and SYN-ACK packets. This implies an attacker
can simply bombard a server with ACK packets contain-
ing random values of ISN, out of which hopefully, one
would be correct.
This would allow a connection to be established. Using
only ACKs would allow an attacker to even bypass fire-
walls, since most of them filter out incoming packets with
SYN bit set.
3 The Vulnerability
Fig 1: Network Setup
With syn-cookies there is a reduced cost of guessing
the ISN for a successful connection forgery. Currently,
the kernel accepts cookies that were created less than 2
minutes ago. This gives 2 delta counter values (0-1) that
are accepted by the server.
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It accepts 4 MSS values. In total, server would accept
2 ∗ 4 = 8, combinations of timer t and MSS values. Each
of these would give a correct ISN with the secret function.
To an attacker, guessing the value is now 8 in 232. Ini-
tially, the kernel accepted 4 counter values and 8 MSS
values. Even though the number of valid ISNs has been
reduced from 32 to 8, we show that a connection forgery
is still feasible.
We used VMs to avoid bringing down an actual net-
work or server. The victim does no activity and just exists
on the network. The server runs an apache server on port
80 with a few files hosted. The attacker and victim are
on the same network and can talk to the server via the
Gateway.
Before we carry out the attack, the target server must
be in cookie mode. However, current implementations
use TCP-SYN-ACK mode with a backlog queue.
Backlog queue size:
cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp max syn backlog
Only when the backlog overflows i.e. in the case of a
SYN flood and having the backlog filled with half open
connections, does the kernel start using SYN cookies.
check number of half open connections:
netstat -an — grep -c SYN RECV
Fig 2: The Attack
To do this we use our attacker to first carry out a TCP-
SYN flood, forcing the server into using cookies.
On the attacker machine, we add another IP address which
drops all incoming packets. We do this as if we send a
SYN packet from this address, the server will send a reset
packet after some time or the network sends a host un-
available. To prevent this, we add the address and drop
incoming packets.
Our aim is to forge a connection from a spoofed IP to
a server with a GET request. If it is successful the server
would have false logs for a file download. Since the server
does not remember any state, we can forge connection by
guessing ISN in ACK packets.We crafted ACK packets
with guessed ISNs and the payload was a GET request.
4 Results
Fig 3: Virtual Machine Run 1
A linear search is currently not possible as it is infea-
sible to send all possible packets before the counter value
changes. Thus a large integer is used to cover the space
uniformly. We increment the initial ACK number using
this large integer rather than a linear increment.
We observed that if the initial ACK number is care-
fully chosen wrt to the time of the day and the servers
response to a test query, the attack can be optimized to
run faster.
Fig 4: Virtual Machine Run 2
Fig 5: Real Machine Run
As the attack depends in various factors such as when
the attack was started, the initial ACK number and in-
crement set, we observed attacks at random times, with
the best being within 26 minutes of start, and also some
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within a minute of each other.
The graphs show that the attack is spaced over time.
Certain gaps occur in the virtual machine runs due to
the servers on which the VMs were hosted, randomly
killed/paused long running jobs(here the VM instances)
The results are got from the server logs. As there are too
many packets being sent, along with normal network traf-
fic, using tcpdump to capture was not possible. The tcp-
dump buffer overflows and discards packets, due to which
the results also end up getting lost. We inspected the log
of the apache server. The log contains a record only if the
connection was successfully completed ie spoofed.
5 Conclusion
With networks getting faster, it would be possible to send
more packets in a minute to cover more possible valid
combinations for the SYN cookie. This reduces the time
needed for the attack and makes it more feasible to be
carried out in a public setting such as a coffee shop. The
attack demonstrated also shows that we do not need to
guess all 32 bits of the ISN. When SYN cookies are in
use, it is sufficient to guess the last 24 bits with all possi-
ble valid combinations of the leading 8 bits.
Currently, our version of the attack is not possible in
a public setting without further optimization. In our tri-
als on real devices over a wireless network, it led to the
network crashing, preventing others from accessing the
Internet. In the virtual machine environment setup on a
single machine and also on real machines connected di-
rectly via LAN cables, the attack was successful.
6 Next Steps
While a good intrusion detection system should be able
to detect a SYN flood, this may lead to a false assump-
tion that the attackers intention is to DOS the server. This
may preemptively lead to the system being put into SYN
Cookie mode which is exactly what is desired. An IDS or
Network admin should consider the possibility that they
might be simply being used to frame someone or have
fake access logs planted.
Consider an attack scenario where an attacker wants
to access some files on the system. This may be an envi-
ronment where classified data is stored and only insiders
have access to it. To cover ones tracks, an insider may
download the classified files but at the same time carry
out this attack. Now the log files are no longer untainted.
Audit logs to be admissible in court as legal evidence have
a requirement that they were not tampered with. Follow-
ing the attack, it is difficult to successfully prove that the
defendant did indeed download the files. Their informa-
tion may have simply been planted during the attack.[5]
While this vulnerability is known, the scope for mis-
use has not been considered. An attacker may already
know how to use this exploit to cover their tracks or even
frame an innocent by spoofing activity to questionable
sites. Due to this, a public disclosure is needed rather
than a private disclosure. Since it’s very difficult to mod-
ify the TCP protocol to increase the ISN field beyond 32
bits[1].
The only feasible mitigation currently possible is to
block all requests from an IP, which come within mi-
croseconds of each other. However, if the ip is spoofed,
the legitimate user with that IP would also get blocked.
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